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THE AUTOMOBILE IN COURT
WILLIAm E. KNEPPER*
The Problem
The population explosion of the middle of this twentieth cen-
tury has brought with it a marked increase in the number of auto-
mobiles on our highways. And a great many of these automobiles
have found their way into our courts. It has been reported that a
summons is issued every thirty seconds for a traffic law violation in
New York City, and that in 1959 about one-third of the nation's
approximately 90,000,000 motorists were cited to appear in traffic
courts for quasi-criminal offenses.'
That, however, is only a small part of the total story. In 1959,
41.3 per cent 2 of all those killed in accidents3 lost their lives in motor
vehicle accidents. 4 Disabling injuries from motor vehicle accidents
numbered about 1,400,000 in 1959, at an estimated cost of nearly six
billion dollars.5
It is common knowledge that a very high percentage of automo-
bile accidents resulted in claims for damages and suits thereon, al-
though statistics show that 95 per cent of the actions brought were
settled and only about 1.5 per cent of all claims of this nature have
gone to judgment after trial.0 As a result of this litigation, it has been
asserted that automobile accident cases clutter up and delay the ef-
fective functioning of our judicial system. 7 Discussing the same subject,
Governor Brown of California is quoted as saying that the "processes
of justice are too slow and public skepticism about the inadequacy of
our present court organization and administration is already wide-
*Partner, Knepper, White, Richards, Miller & Roberts, Columbus, Ohio. B.A.,
1931, Ohio State University. Ohio Bar Examining Committee, 1945-50; International
Association of Insurance Counsel; American Judicature Society; American College
of Trial Lawyers; Editor, Insurance Counsel Journal. Member, Columbus, Ohio
State and American Bar Associations.
1Zeichner, The Errant Motorist: Public Enemy No. 1, 46 A.B.A.J. 151 (g6o).
237,800.
191,600.
'National Safety Council, Accident Facts (196o).
'Ibid.
OGair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 16o N.E.2d 43, 46 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 374
(1960)-
7 Veigel, Preliminary Report on Plans for Inquiry Into the Wisdom of a Cali-
fornia Automobile Accident Commission, 34 Calif. State B. J. 393, 402 (1959)-
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spread."s "The use of the automobile for every movement-to go to
the corner grocery, to take the children to school, to go to business and
social affairs, for vacations, for business trips, for every reason under
the sun and for no reason at all"-is charged with causing an almost
incredible number of personal injury and property damage suits.9
Court congestion and delay in the disposition of litigation have
become matters of nationwide concern and have resulted in numer-
ous studies. In May, 1956, there was convened, on the invitation of
Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., a Conference on Court
Congestion and Delay in Litigation, composed of the presidents of
the bar associations of the states and larger cities and the heads of
other bar, judicial and research organizations. The executive commit-
tee of this conference promptly reported that, "Prolonged and unjusti-
fied delay is the major weakness of our judicial system today."' 0
However, it has been shown that the principal problems of court
congestion and delay exist only in a few metropolitan centers, and
that the blame for the conditions there existing cannot be saddled
on one type of case-namely, automobile litigation."
The problem of delay in court is not new. Governors of New York
complained about it as long ago as 1828.12 Roscoe Pound, addressing
the American Bar Association Annual Meeting in 19o6 on "Causes
of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice," voiced
the belief that the primary cause of such dissatisfaction, then as now,
was delay. 13
But today, in searching f,: a "whipping boy," numerous persons
and organizations are charging that the automobile .in court is the
cause of most of our problems of court congestion and delay. Writers
are asking whether the "negligence law of the nineteenth century," the
"horse and buggy doctrines of the 18oo's," can "withstand the strains
of the highway and skyway of tomorrow."1 4
It cannot be'denied that the mere presence of the automobile in
1i For the Defense 2 (196o).
'LaBrum, Congested Trial Calendars: It's About Time To Do Something About
Them, 43 A.BA.J. 311 (1957).
"The Law's Delay: Report of the Attorney General's Conference, 43 A.B.A.J. 242
('957)-
"Ghiardi and Morris, Can Courts, Juries and Cars Coexist, 24 Ins. Counsel J. 346,
353 (1957).
"FHart, Shall the Jury System be Sacrificed on the Altar of Economy, 27 N.Y.
State B. Bull. 146 (1956).
"Burger, The Courts on Trial: A Call for Action Against Delay, 44 A.B.A.J. 738
(195r8).
"Green, Traffic Victims, Tort Law and Insurance, 63, 68 (1958).
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court is an important factor in the creation of the problem with which
we are now faced. However, that problem has become one of major
consequence as a result of some contributing causes, to which we now
turn our attention.
Some Causal Factors
We should be less than realistic if we ignored the fact that the
driver of a high-powered automobile, as a mere human being, is con-
fronted with a multiplicity of hazards and duties as he spins along our
streets and highways. As Green 15 puts it, he "must observe the op-
eration of other vehicles, front and rear and to the sides... must ob-
serve road signs, stop signs, cautions, traffic lines, light signals and
those of traffic officers ... must observe his speed and that of others ...
must watch for signals of other mortists and give proper signals him-
self... must know the operating mechanisms of his machine, check
their operations as he travels, and maintain his rapidly moving and
complex machine under control at all times."
Confronted with these and further heavy responsibilities as a
motorist, the "law-abiding citizen in a moment may turn into a traffic
violator almost without intending to be such and may find the step
to manslaughter on the highway even shorter than he imagines."'16
If such a driver is a stable, reasonably mature individual with an
adequate control of his emotions, he may be expected to maintain those
characteristics when he takes the wheel of a car.17 If he is properly
trained as a driver and abides by his training, he is likely to escape
injury.',
Unfortunately, too many motorists do not meet those specifica-
tions, else the record of traffic law violations would not show that
the traffic case load has mounted, as year by year more cars roll onto
car-saturated roads.10 To deal with this aspect of the problem, there
must be more effective law enforcement and more individual self-
discipline, and the motorist must come to realize that his duties as a
driver include not only the safety of himself but also a great social
responsibility for the safety of others who ride in and drive auto-
mobiles on the highways.
qId. at 66-67.
" Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt, quoted in Zeichner, The Errant Mortorist:
Public Enemy No. 1, 46 A.B.A.J. 151 (196o).
171d. at 152.
28Gene Blake, writing in the Los Angeles Times of December 13, 1959, says that
one out of every two Californians now living will die or be seriously injured in a
traffic accident before reaching the age of 65 years.
lFZeichner, The Errant Motorist: Public Enemy No. 1, 46 A.B.A.J. 151 (196o).
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In addition, there has developed in the last decade an increased
claim consciousness on the part of the American people. A general
feeling has grown up that if something happens to injure a person or
his property, someone else ought to pay for it, regardless of whether
the injured person might have caused the damage himself. William
H. Rodda, Secretary of the Transportation Insurance Rating Bureau,
Chicago, speaking before an institute of the Nebraska Insurance
Federation in Omaha, in October, 1959, said:
"There is also the feeling that an accident should be made a
profitable thing whenever possible. Excessive verdicts for acci-
dents, and in some areas the activities of ambulance chasers,
have contributed to this feeling that a person can make money
out of any accident that occurs." 20
The utterly unscrupulous attitude of many persons in the matter of
claims for damages has been severely criticized by the Very Rev.
Francis J. Connell, of Catholic University of America, who has said:
"When a person has suffered some real harm, he may press his
claim to the genuine amount of loss he has incurred and may
make use of legal measures to win his claim. But if he demands
more than what he realizes was the true amount of the injury,
he is just as truly a thief as a man who enters a house and steals
from a safe."2 1
Despite the efforts that have been made in public education,
there is an unfortunate lack of general understanding that insurance
companies are fundamentally merely the administrators of the funds
with which they pay claims and satisfy judgments. Those funds are
derived from the premium contributions of the motorists in the juris-
diction of the court where the awards are made, and it is the "home
town dollar" provided by the motorist himself, not wealth from the
treasury of some non-resident corporation, that foots the bill for au-
tomobile accident losses. Were this fact better understood, it probably
would not have been necessary for Monsignor Connell to say:
"Sometimes people have the idea that when an insurance com-
pany is bearing the expense, they may raise the amount be-
yond the sum of actual damage. Of course, this is an erroneous
notion. It is just as much a sin of injustice to exact money from
an insurance company by false claims as it is to victimize a
private individual."22
Thoughtful observers have noted an apparent weakening of the
"444 Ins. L. J. (1959).
r1The Liguorian, July, 1958.
=Ibid.
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moral fiber of the community as it bears on claims for personal in-
juries. In a recent report,22a a committee of prominent trial lawyers
says:
"Prosecuting authorities, even judges, ignore demonstrated ins-
tances of perjury and, as if they arose out of some kind of game,
they are lightly brushed aside. There seems to be a belief, even
among people of otherwise high moral principle, that the word
'honesty' has a different and more liberalized meaning in litiga-
tion involving claims for personal injuries."
Coincidental with the development of those attitudes has been
the formation and growth of an organization of lawyers23 claiming
to be "dedicated to the rights of injured persons." It came into exist-
ence in 1946 and was "7500 strong" in 1959.24 It became the advocate
of "the adequate award, ' 25 and then "the more adequate award. ' 26
It decried "gaslight verdicts in the atomic age."27 It described its
"adversaries" as "the powerful insurance associations and lobbyists,
the gigantic automotive industry, the vast drug and pharmaceutical
enterprises and others. '2s It gave as a reason for the increasing size of
jury verdicts the fact that "the plaintiffs' bar has become better trained
and educated."29 Its editor-in-chief has spoken of it as "an unvarnished
bar association of plaintiffs' lawyers,"30 and as an "organization to
comfort the afflicted and to afflict the comfortable." 31
A past president of that organization, and one of its most prolific
writers has authored a five-volume, 5018 page work expounding his
views as to what the plaintiff, his counsel, his investigators, his wit-
nesses, the judge and the jury should do in a personal injury case. 32
Dean William L. Prosser says33 that this book tells "how to wring
from an impressed and sympathetic jury every last possible nickle
that can be obtained for the plaintiff, and how to build up and mag-
22Report of Automobile Insurance Committee-1957, 25 Ins. Counsel J. 11, 12
(,959).
--National Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys, commonly called
"NACCA."
2 'NACCA Thirteenth Annual Convention Proceedings 749 (1959).
Belli, the Adequate Award, 39 Calif. L. Rev. ( 1951).
2Belli, The More Adequate Award (1952), noted in io NACCA L.J. 342 (1952).
2-Lambert, NACCA-Rumor and Reflection, 18 NACCA L.J. 25, 33 (1956).
"'Ashe, NACCA-An Appraisal of Its Objectives, NACCA Thirteenth Annual
Convention Proceedings 748 (1959).
2iLambert, NACCA-Rumor and Reflection, 18 NACCA L.J. 25, 33 (1956).
wIbid.
3'24 Ins. Counsel J. 178 (1957).
'-Belli, Modern Trials (1954). Volumes 4 and 5 relating to Damages were pub-
lished in 1959.
'343 Calif. L. Rev. 556, 557 (1955)-
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nify whatever case he may have until the recovery reaches or exceeds
the absolute maximum which any court can conceivably allow to
stand." He notes that the author "has no interest or concern with
evenhanded justice" but seeks the "maximum possible amount for
the plaintiff."
In reviewing that book in 1955, Dean Prosser predicted that, as its
impact spread across the country, more would be heard of proposals
to abolish jury trials in personal injury suits in the United States.
He spoke as a prophet. The "Hollywood Type of Trial," advocated
by the NACGA writers, has emerged in state after state, and dissatisfac-
tion with that type of court proceeding has unquestionably been an
important factor in producing the spoken and written words of judges,
torts professors, editors, insurance executives, and office holders in
high places, who question whether we must sacrifice our heritage of
trial by jury for reasons of economic necessity.
3 4
Another development during the past decade relates to the medi-
cal aspects of personal injury litigation. The organized plaintiffs' law-
yers consider the subjects of forensic medicine and medical-legal learn-
ing of "prime importance" in their educational program.35 They have
devoted hundleds of thousands of man-hours to seminars where
doctors and lawyers join in training their fellows in the art of "mak-
ing the most" out of even trivial injuries. A flood of books relating
to medical-legal matters and trial tactics has streamed from the presses.
In their thousands of pages these books supplement the material pre-
sented in the seminars. Their publishers make a direct appeal to the
profit motive, as is evidenced by advertising urging prospective readers
to "cash in on negligence cases" and to "learn better ways to obtain
larger verdicts in personal injury cases."
The Law-Science Academy of America and its affiliate, The Law-
Science Foundation of America, under the leadership of Dr. Hubert
Winston Smith, a physician-lawyer on the faculty of the University
of Texas School of Law, conduct teaching programs in "medicolegal
trial techniques" from coast to coast and, in the summer of 196o pre-
sented such a program for eight weeks at Crested Butte, Montana,
where registrants may vacation with their families while studying what
Dr. Smith has called "the nature and consequences of trauma and in-
jury in respect to civil and criminal litigation, and medicolegal trial
technique." 30 These same organizations are establishing a law club for
a'Ryan, Some Signs of Approaching Disaster, i For the Defense i (ig6o).
'Lambert, NACCA-Rumor and Reflection, 18 NACCA L.J. 25, 3o (3956).
6Smith, Law-Science Movement: Philosophy and Practice, 9 Va. L. Weekly, No.
4 0958).
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students who are particularly interested in preparing for trial prac-
tice and will provide "scholarships" for some such students at the
Crested Butte program. While Dr. Smith has described the Law-Science
Academy as "a spearhead of a social movement for the improvement of
Law and the administration of Justice," 37 his teaching program prob-
ably tends to overemphasize the medical aspects of personal injury
trials, with the results that (i) some such trials are more time-con-
suming than would seem to be justified, (2) certain types of injuries
are caused to appear more serious than they really are, and (3) the
emphasis on injuries and damages tends to minimize the importance of
determining that liability must exist before damages can be awarded.
Another contributing cause of our existing court congestion and
delay is the apparent unwillingness of parties and their counsel to
settle cases without going to court. J. Harry LaBrum,38 in an excel-
lent discussion of this subject, says:
"A staggering part of our backlog in almost every court repre-
sents cases which will never be tried. They are bound to be set-
tled. Many of them are cases which, with some determined
effort and plain talk by an adjuster or by house counsel, would
never have reached court."
3 9
There is too much of the "courthouse door" complex in settlement
negotiations. We are told that this is due to "human nature." If that
be true, the time has come when lawyers and litigants must sul'stitute
good judgment and common sense for such human nature. Every just
claim, whether it be for personal injury or property damage, should
be promptly and adequately compensated, and every non-meritorious
or exaggerated claim should be effectively resisted. This means that
both sides should fairly, honestly and realistically evaluate a case
and make a determined effort to dispose of it, if a settlement is war-
ranted, at the earliest possible moment. Also it is necessary to make a
further reduction in the number of cases presently coming to trial by
using the influence of the judicial machinery to dispose of lawsuits
before they reach the courtroom. Unquestionably, the increasing cost
of litigation plays a substantial part in the current agitation for some
plan, other than trial by jury, to dispose of automobile accident
claims.
40
3"Quoted from the Newsletter of the Law-Science Academy, September 15, 1959.
',Of the Philadelphia bar.
X'LaBrum, Congested Trial Calendars: It's About Time To Do Something About
Them, 43 A.B.A.J. 311, 312 (957).
'0 Cowie, The Growing Cost of Tort Litigation and Its Significance to The Public
and The Profession, 26 Ins. Counsel J. 590, 592 (1959).
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Finally, in surveying these causal factors of court congestion and
delay, we must recognize the following:
41
(1) Undermanned courts.
(2) Lack of centralized court administration.
(3) Inadequate case assignment methods.
(4) Uneven distribution of judicial work.
(5) Failure to make adequate use of time-saving methods like pre-
trial.
(6) Inefficient use of the time judges spend at work.
(7) Dilatory tactics of some lawyers and their tolerance by some
courts.
(8) Complicated court systems.
(9) Short jury trial days.
42
(io) Short jury terms.
(11) Prolonged vacation periods.
(12) Lack of standardized instructions and proper rules of court.
(13) Insufficient number of trial lawyers in some law offices hand-
ling a large number of negligence cases.
(14) Lack of cooperation of some counsel with the courts.
The listing of those causes of court congestion and delay readily
emphasizes the fact that manpower is the basic problem. The crea-
tion of additional judgeships has been recommended on countless oc-
casions. But the full utilization of our existing judicial manpower
is as important as the creation of new judgeships. Such a rare and
unique resource must not be wasted. 42'
Likewise, better use must be made of the available trial lawyers,
especially in the large metropolitan areas. It is true that much civil
trial work is concentrated in a few law offices, but changes in sche-
duling procedures and a firm policy of avoiding last minute delays
can do much to improve this situation. Also, the legal profession must
train young men to take care of the legal needs of the community, 42b
and when more business becomes concentrated in one firm than it can
handle, it must put on more legal help or let some of the business go
to offices which have the time to handle it.42c
.Ghairdi and Morris, Can Courts, Juries and Cars Coexist, 25 Ins. Counsel J.
346, 351 (1957); Norris. The Law's Delays in Ohio: Remedy Without New Legisla-
tion, 33 The Ohio Bar 789 (196o).
2See also, Kalven, Zeisel and Buchholz, Delay in Court, chs. 15 and 16 (1959).
"-2Johnson, Judicial Manpower Problems, 328 The Annals of The American
Academy of Political and Social Science 29-36 (March, ig6o).
1bJudge Ulysses Schwartz in Gray v. Gray, 6 Ill. App. 571, 58o-81, 128 N.E.2d 6o2,
6o6-o7 (1955).
,'Mr. Justice Jackson in Knickerbocker Printing Corp. v. United States, 348 U.S.
875 (1954).
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Of 'course, the causes of court congestion and delay mentioned
above apply to all types of personal injury litigation, not merely to
automobile cases. In 1959 work accidents injured 4,3o0,000 persons,
home accidents disabled about 4,000,000 persons, and public non-
motor-vehicle accidents produced about 2,00oooo disabling injuries.
43
Thus, we see that the disabling injuries (1,400,000) from automobile ac-
cidents amounted to about 12 per cent of the total. But it is likely
that automobile accidents produce more lawsuits per accident than
do the other types, although no reliable statistics have been found.
Consequently, it is understandable that the hue and cry for reform
is directed at automobile accident litigation. Let us, then, consider
some of the suggested remedies.
Some Proposed Remedies
As a result of the mounting toll of losses due to bodily injuries
and deaths caused by the operation of automobiles, and the court
congestion and delay allegedly resulting, at least in part, therefrom,
many persons have come forth with "remedial" suggestions which
they hope or believe may provide solutions to the apparent problem.
Financial responsibility laws exist in forty-nine states44 and are being
constantly improved. Massachusetts, North Carolina and New York
have compulsory insurance statutes.45 Legislation has been enacted in
various forms to provide for unsatisfied judgment funds.46 "Medical
pay" provisions in insurance policies have been broadened, and one
insurance company is writing a policy that includes a voluntary com-
pensation plan.
Rehabilitation of injured automobile accident victims is a subject
that is receiving careful study. This subject presents a problem more
serious than that of rehabilitation of persons injured at work, in which
field considerable progress has been made. Many automobile accident
victims could be helped substantially by having access to great re-
habilitation centers such as the Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation,
in West Orange, New Jersey, the Institute for the Crippled and Dis-
abled and the Institute of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation at
New York University-Bellevue Medical Center. Establishment of
similar facilities throughout the country is in process but needs to be
expedited. Rehabilitation has emerged as a new and dynamic force
3National Safety Council, Accident Facts (ig6o).
"Loiseaux, Innocent Victims 1959, 38 Texas L. Rev. 154, 157 (1959).
45Ibid.
"North Dakota, New Jersey, Maryland and New York.
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in modern medicine and its effective utilization can do much to re-
pair the damages suffered by automobile accident victims. An antici-
pated result thereof would be less litigation and fewer exorbitant
verdicts.
46a
Lately there has been a renewal of interest, in some quarters, in
automobile accident compensation concepts which would compel the
payment of compensation regardless of fault.47 The only such program
now in operation in the Americas is in effect in the Province of Sas-
katchewan, Canada.
48
These compensation proposals are predicated upon the premise
that the automobile accident is a social hazard, an inevitable result,
and a by-product of motor-minded American progress. 40 One writer
contends, "The use of automobiles is compulsory, not voluntary; the
risk of injury is compulsory; protection by insurance should be com-
pulsory, and without regard to fault." 50 Support for this concept stems
"from the difficulty of fixing or measuring blame in most accidents
and from the idea that our society should shoulder the responsibility
for alleviating injury inherent in its mechanization." 51
Under such a program every person who sustained injury would
be paid according to a fixed schedule of compensation. 52 "The heedless,
callous person causing injury would be paid on the identical formula
as the innocent victim." 53 The careful motorist would have his de-
fenses taken away from him and would be required to underwrite
4"See Fougner, Rehabilitation: Its Future Role in Third Party Claims, 27 Ins.
Counsel J. 378 (196o).
"Since at least 1925, Robert S. Marx, of Cincinnati, Ohio has advocated such a
plan. See Marx, Compulsory Compensation Insurance, 25 Col. L. Rev. 164 (1925);
Marx, Compensation Insurance For Automobile Accident Victims: The Case for
Compulsory Automobile Compensation Insurance, 15 Ohio St. L.J. (1954)-
'8For a discussion of this and other plans (recently proposed), see Ryan and
Green, Pedestrianism: A Strange Philo.-ophy, 42 A.B.A.J. 117, ii8 (1956). See also
Ehrenzweig, "Full Aid" Insurance for the Traffic Victim, Univ. of Calif. Press (1954),
reviewed by Prof. Fleming James in 43 Calif. L. Rev. 559 (955); and Green, Traffic
Victims, Tort Law and Insurance (1958).
"0 Marx, Compensation Insurance for Automobile Accident Victims: The Case
For Compulsory Automobile Compensation Insurance, 15 Ohio St. L.J. 134, 137 (1956).
5Id. at 138.
"1Weigel, Preliminary Report on Plans for Inquiry Into the Wisdom of a Cali-
fornia Automobile Accident Commission, 34 Calif. State B. J. 393, 403 (1959)..It is sometimes suggested that payment would be denied to a motorist who is
guilty of driving while drunk, or at greatly excessive speeds, or similar inexcusable,
quasi-criminal or actually criminal conduct. See Weigel, supra note 51.
OKramer, Fallacies of a Compensation Plan for Automobile Accident Litigation,
26 Ins. Counsel J. 420, 421 (1959).
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compensation for the careless and the irresponsible, to pay them for
injuries that they caused to themselves.5
4
The sponsors of such suggestions seem to see nothing unrealistic
in the idea of special generosity to a particular class of sufferers (auto-
mobile accident victims) while ignoring the "economic losses" result-
ing from injuries and deaths occurring in airplanes, on railroads, in
the home, on the farm, and everywhere other than on the highways.
If the matter is to be approached from the standpoint of social re-
sponsibility, it would seem that the compensation idea should include
any and all forms of accidental injury and death. As shown above, in
1959, out of a total of some ii,8oo,ooo accidental deaths and injuries,
about 1o,362,200 were nonautomotive accidents, and only 1,437,8oo
injuries and deaths were caused by automobiles in the entire United
States.5 Should our "social responsibility" require us to provide com-
pensation for the 1o,362,200 persons injured and killed otherwise than
by automobile accidents? Should all those who have provided accident
insurance and financial responsibility for themselves if an acci-
dent be the result of their fault be compelled by law to provide fi-
nancial protection for persons who, injured as a result of their own
negligence, have failed to provide accident-insurance for themselves?56
There are those who point to workmen's compensation as if it
were the "father" of the automobile commission compensation concept.
The two situations are not analogous, as has been frequently demon-
strated.57 In workmen's compensation the accident must arise out of
and in the course of employment; the employer can and does pass on
his cost of insurance or loss to his customer; there is privity of con-
tract between the employer and claimant; preventive safety measures
can be used effectively; facts can be established by an immediate in-
vestigation on the premises where the accident occurs; there is com-
parative equality of awards based on generally similar wage scales; the
employee has a job to go back to and this, combined with the rela-
tionship of employer-employee, tends to speed recovery from disability
and reduce fraudulent claims and exaggeration of injuries; workmen's
'McVay, Reply to "The Case For Compulsory Automobile Compensation In-
surance," 15 Ohio St. L.J. 161, 166 (1954).
4National Safety Council, Accident Facts, (196o).
'McVay, supra note 54.
,Ryan and Green, Pedestrianism: A Strange Philosophy, 42 A.B.A.J. 117, 119-120
(1956); Sherman, Grounds for Opposing the Automobile Accident Compensation
Plan, 3 Law & Contemp. Prob. 598 (1936); Note, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 147 (1957);
Lilly, Compulsory Automobile Insurance, Compulsory Compensation for Motor
Vehicle Injuries and Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Laws, Ass'n of Cas.
and Surety Executives, 53 (i93o, as reprinted in 1932).
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compensation does not operate when the worker injures the em-
ployer.58
Moreover, there has been much criticism of the volume of litiga-
tion generated by workmen's compensation claims. In the states where
an employee may appeal to the courts from an adverse finding by the
workmen's compensation commission (of which Ohio is one)- 9 there
are numerous instances in which workmen's compensation appeals are
contributing substantially to the congestion of the court dockets. It
has been well said that the amount of court litigation in workmen's
compensation represents "a great gap between theory and practice." 60
Some of this litigation turns on questions of law,0 ' but many cases are
appealed in order to present questions of fact to juries in trial courts. 2
When the foregoing factors are considered in conjunction with
the criticisms of inadequacy of benefits in some areas and excessively
high administrative expenses in many instances, it seems apparent that
an automobile commission compensation concept cannot be justified
upon the theory that since workmen's compensation is "good," it would
be "good" also.
The California Preliminary Report G3 recognizes that, "In order to
keep the cost of universal compensation to automobile accident vic-
tims within manageable bounds, there would have to be some limits
upon the amount of payments." 4 All injured persons would be paid
the same for like injuries and disabilities. Sponsors of such proposals
suggest that individual insurance could be carried to provide addi-
tional protection in cases where such awards would be inadequate or
inequitable. Thus the skilled surgeon, who lost an arm in an auto-
'Ryan and Green, supra note 57.
'Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4123.519 (Baldwin 1958).
"Reid, U.S. Bureau of Labor Standards, Bull. 172, p. 157.
"The few and seemingly simple words 'arising out of and in the course of the
employment' have been the fruitful (or fruitless) source of a mass of decisions turning
upon nice distinctions and supported by refinements so subtle as to leave the mind of
the reader in a maze of confusion." Lord Wrenbury in Herbert v. Samuel Fox & Co.
(1916) i A.C. 405, 419, cited by Mr. Justice Murphy in Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 330 U.S. 469, 479 (1947)-
"See, e.g., Hallworth v. Republic Steel Corp., 153 Ohio St. 549, 91 N.E.2d 690
195o); Drakulich v. Industrial Comm'n, 137 Ohio St. 82, 27 N.E.2d 932 (194o); Long
v. Industrial Comm'n, io6 Ohio App. 228, 149 N.E.2d 922 (1957); McGary v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 104 Ohio App. 149, 146 N.E.2d 274 (1956); Williams v. Industrial
Comm'n, 95 Ohio App. 275, 119 N.E.2d 126 (953).
03Weigel, supra note 51.
"4A frequent suggestion has been to model payments on those found in acci-
dent and health insurance policies: viz., so much for medical and hospital expense,
so much for a broken leg, so much for loss of both eyes, etc. See also Greene, Must
We Discard Our Law of Negligence in Personal Injury Cases, 19 Ohio St. L.J. 290,
309 0958).
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mobile accident through no fault of his own, would be expected to
insure his own losses over and above the amount the commission would
pay, under the schedule, to any person who lost an arm, regardless of
age, sex, occupation, condition of health, or degree of fault.
As to the amounts of the payments to be made by an automobile
accident compensation commission, there is no agreement among the
sponsors. Professor James pleads "neither for greater nor for smaller
payments, but rather for a more equitable distribution of whatever we
do pay." 65 He further says, "If penury must be practiced, let it fall
rather on cases where need and hardship are least, by reducing or
even eliminating payments on small claims."06 He would restrict the
proposed compensation to "reparation of economic loss," suggesting
that "allowance for intangible items like pain and suffering (natural
enough where compensation is made by a wrongdoer) may well be out
of place where the bill is being footed by inocent persons." 67
No one contends that such a proposal would result in payment of
amounts approximating those which are paid under the present sys-
tem when the right to be paid is established. Obviously, no compensa-
tion concept could afford to provide just and adequate awards by
common law standards for all persons injured or killed in automobile
accidents, regardless of fault.68
The amounts of payments under the Saskatchewan ptan are gen-
erally deemed inadequate, at least in our more populous areas.69 The
suggested scale of payments would ordinarily be based on the "mini-
mum needs of low-income groups,"7 but, at best, the awards would be
cJames, The Columbia Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents: An
Unanswered Challenge, 59 Col. L. Rev. 408, 421 (1959).
wIbid.
"James, Some Reflections on the Bases of Strict Liability, iS La. L. Rev. 293,
297 (1958).
cKramer, supra note 53.
cWeigel, supra note 51, says that "the Saskatchewan Plan is far from the equiv-
alent of experience with an Automobile Accident Commission in a state such as our
own."
Marx, note 49 supra at 141, says, "Saskatchewan is primarily a rural province.
It does not have the heavy traffic to be found on the roads of Ohio." The Temple
Survey notes that a careful examination of the background of the Saskatchewan
program, "the physical, demographic, and geographic facts of the Saskatchewan
universe, the evolution of the program itself, and an evaluation of the techniques in
use in Saskatchewan, made it apparent that its parameters-social, economic and
physical-are so different from those of New Jersey that no real basis for compari-
son existed." Economics and Business Bulletin, School of Business and Public Ad-
ministration, Temple University, Vol. 12, pp. 54-56 (March, 196o).
n°Ryan and Green, Pedestrianism: A Strange Philosophy, 42 A.B.A.J. 117, 120
(1956).
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similar to workmen's compensation schedules as now adopted by the
various states.71
In California, where such a concept is receiving serious study, there
were about 240,ooo automobile accident claims in Los Angeles County
last year. Gene Blake, writing in the Los Angeles Times,72 makes com-
parative estimates resulting in the conclusion that it would require
3ooo employees and 570 referees, with a budget of $22,000,000, for the
operation of an automobile commission compensation program in
Los Angeles County alone. Conversely, he'shows that these 240,000
claims resulted in 14,500 suits, of which only 4,8oo were actually pro-
cessed through the courts73 under the present jury trial system. All the
rest were settled before the automobile got into court.
Even Professor James, who has written with s6me enthusiasm about
the automobile compensation concept, admits that if such a system
were more expensive to administer and would invite more malingering
and fraud than does the present system, then these charges "would
constitute drawbacks" to such a program.7
4
And then there are those who feel that the proper future course for
the development of tort law lies in a strict rule of liability and the
effective elimination of defenses that enable defendants or their in-
surers to avoid such liability.75 It is difficult to understand the think-
ing behind such proposals in the face of the admission by one of the
proponents that "liability insurance rates here are already the
highest in the world even though strict liability has not been adopt-
ed."7 6 It seems apparent that those who make such proposals do so
without regard to the fact that, by reason of the growing cost of tort
litigation and the heavy underwriting losses of the automobile in-
surers,77 the very existence of private insurance is threatened.73
"For schedules showing compensation awards in the various states, see St. Clair,
The Case for Private Insurance of Workmen's Compensation, 27 Ins. Counsel J. 99,
112-116 (ig6o).
'Issue of December 15, 1959.
"Ibid.
"'James, The Columbia Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents: An
Unanswered Challenge, 59 Col. L. Rev. 408, 419 (1959).
'See Harper and James, The Law of Torts (1956), reviewed by Prof. Warren A.
Seavey in 66 Yale L.J. 955 (1957).
"James, supra note 74, at 418.




See Lusby, The Impact on the Casualty Insurance Industry of Recent Develop-
ments in the Personal Injury Litigation Field, 27 Ins. Counsel J. 23, Vi 096o).
"Cowie, supra note 40, at 693.
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Furthermore, our law to date has developed on the theory that
"strict liability" is usually justified only by the high degree of harm
certain activities are likely to produce and the unusual circumstances
in which such activities generally take place. One writer has suggested
that the "imposition of different rules," such as the rule of strict liabil-
ity, "can be justified only if'the manner in which the activity is pursued
is different from the manner in which the individual member of society
as a whole is expected to conduct his business." 79 The doctrine of
strict liability was certainly never intended to be applied to the oper-
ation of a modern-day service such as the family-purpose-automobile,
which is not inherently dangerous s0 and which can be operated with
safety whenever stable, reasonably mature drivers pay attention to and
respect motor vehicle statutes and the ordinary rules of the road.
Conclusion
That the automobile in court poses some serious problems cannot
be denied. Fortunately, many thinking people are gravely concerned
as to the recent developments, and numerous proposals have been
made for corrective measures.81 Of course, law should never be changed
lightly and "the story of law must teach us that changes are to be
made by the innovations of time slowly and by degrees."
8 2
In a society that offers only limited social security, the wisdom
of special generosity to a particular class of sufferers seems unrealistic,
particularly when a concept such as automobile commission compen-
sation appears to take no account of the cause of the condition it
seeks to remedy.
It is generally agreed that the best defense against injuries is their
prevention. More effective enforcement of our traffic laws is essential.
Drivers of automobiles must be brought to realize that they cannot be
allowed to drive unless they drive safely. The social responsibility of
the motor vehicle operator to protect his fellows from injury and death
on the highways must be recognized. The first step toward the solu-
tion of our problem must be prevention.
But despite all preventive measures, accidents will continue to oc-
nGreene, Must We Discard Our Law of Negligence in Personal Injury Cases,
ig Ohio St. L. J. 290, 299 (1958).
8*EIms v. Flick, ioo Ohio St. 186, 126 N.E. 66 (1919). Compare Elliott v. Harding,
107 Ohio St. 5oi, 14o N.E. 338, 36 A.L.R. 1128 (1923), and Williamson v. Eclipse
Motor Lines, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 467, 62 N.E.2d 339, 168 A.L.R. 1356 (1945). See
also 5 A Am. Jur. Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 194 (1956).
8mLoiseaux, supra note 44.
"Zane, The Story of Law.
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cur and persons will continue to be injured and killed. How, then,
shall fair and reasonable compensation be made? There is no assur-
ance that a commission compensation concept will relieve court con-
gestion83 and, as shown above, there is reason to believe that the
cost of operating such a plan would be enormous. Furthermore, the
thesis of liability without fault is antagonistic to our long standing
conviction that a man's freedom of action is subject only to his obli-
gation not to infringe any duty of care which he owes to others.
8 4
It is not sound legal thinking to recommend the adoption of a
proposal such as liability without fault, which is entirely foreign to
our basic concepts, merely because of the type of activity pursued by
some drivers of automobiles, while the rest of our society lives under
different rules.8 5 While it is natural that well-meaning persons will
propose drastic changes in an effort to remedy the problem, it is our
duty as lawyers and citizens to make sure that such changes as are made
will be consistent with the ultimate best interests of all the people, and
that they will preserve and maintain individual dignity and indi-
vidual rights in our free society. The principle of individual re-
sponsibility for action is so firmly imbedded in our law that any
change eliminating that principle would be bound to cause a chain
reaction bringing about deterioration of moral standards in par-
ticulars not now predictable. Also, we submit, the doctrine of lia-
bility without fault tends to make the individual "a beneficiary of
his own carelessness and his own disregard for his fellow man."80
An intelligent and realistic approach to change, combined with a
vigorous and well conceived attack on the real causes of court con-
gestion and delay, will solve the problem of the automobile in court.
It is neither necessary nor sensible to destroy our system of jurisprud-
ence to accomplish that result.
83Loiseaux, supra note 44.
'Read v. J. Lyons & Co., [1947] A.C. 156, 171. See also Prosser, Torts, 15, 315-49
(2d ed. 1955).
6Compare Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by De-
fects in Products-An Opposing View, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 938, 948 (1957).
8Kramer, Fallacies of a Compensation Plan for Automobile Accident Litigation,
26 Ins. Counsel . 420, 424 (1959).
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